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Pre-1500
Historians are held hostage by the sources that are available to them, and
for that reason, the historiography of medieval towns is dominated by
research on thirteenth-, fourteenth- or fifteenth-century case-studies. In
preceding centuries, literacy was largely the monopoly of ecclesiastical
milieus, who were often hostile or simply not interested in describing the
urban settlements which then emerged all over Europe. An interesting
exception, however, is the Breton town of Redon, which took shape
around an abbey that was established in 832 with support of the
Carolingian Emperor Louis the Pious. By navigating the unusually
extensive set of Carolingian cartularies of this abbey, as well as the
available cartographic and archaeological evidence, Julien Bachelier has
developed an incisive sketch of the development of a town in the shadow
of the Carolingian abbey in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (‘Une ville
abbatiale bretonne. Redon du IXe au XIVe siècle’, Histoire Urbaine, 48
(2017), 133–54). This case-study confirms once again that the urbanization
of medieval Europe was more than a side-effect of the rebirth of long-
distance trade as the canonical Pirenne thesis would have it. The Redon
case provides a valuable contribution to the revisionist perspective that
stresses the importance of local demand from abbeys, episcopal palaces
and castles as a stimulus for urban development (see esp. the seminal
work of A. Verhulst, The Rise of Cities in North-West Europe (Cambridge,
1999)).
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Another noteworthy contribution to the economy of medieval cities
is Kate Staples’ exploratory investigation of the ‘grey markets’ in
Paris (‘Con-artists or entrepreneurs? Fripperers and market space in
thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Paris’, J. of Medieval History, 43 (2017),
228–54). Proceeding from a critical analysis of normative sources, she
presents a reinterpretation of the second-hand market in clothing and
similar goods, a sector that was an important arena for female labour
and entrepreneurship. The result is an effective challenge to older
interpretations, in which fripperers were marginal in the urban economy.
Instead, they answered important needs to the burgeoning population of
the French capital: as clothing was a relatively expensive commodity as
opposed to labour in the pre-Plague era, the business of repairing and
reselling used clothes was a necessary complement to the better-studied
market segment of cloth production. This article dovetails nicely with
similar research for the early modern era, and thus opens up exciting
venues for long-run analysis of urban textile markets (see esp. the various
contributions in J. Stobart (ed.), Selling Textiles in the Long Eighteenth
Century: Comparative Perspectives from Western Europe (London, 2014)).
Next to the classic juxtaposition of norm and practice, economic
historians are breaking new ground by rethinking the nature of the
institutions that defined and redefined the normative framework. An
interesting application of this New Institutional Economics paradigm
is the reassessment by Justyna Wubs-Mrozewicz of the Hansa, a late
medieval trade federation that included c. 200 towns in the Baltic and
North Sea area. The central claim is that, apart from other, better-studied
commercial and political assets, the Hanse mattered to its members
because it allowed for the articulation and implementation of a relatively
efficient and impartial mechanism for conflict resolution that largely
revolved around arbitration and mediation, rather than costly and time-
consuming court settlements. Even if disputes over deals, both within the
Hanse as with external partners, were rather rare, the Hanse mattered
because it provided merchants with a framework for dispute settlement
to which all involved parties could agree, thus lowering the threshold
to engage in commercial ventures. An extremely similar argument has
been developed by Mika Kallioinen, who focuses on the fourteenth-
and fifteenth-century evidence for Finnish towns and their main trading
partners (e.g. Gdansk or Stockholm). The correspondence of its traders
provides an empirical complement to the evidence of Wubs-Mrozewicz,
which is more geared towards records from German and Netherlandish
towns, and reveals the crucial role of urban governments in setting
up ‘the rules of the game’ (J. Wubs-Mrozewicz, ‘The late medieval
and early modern Hanse as an institution of conflict management’,
Continuity and Change, 32 (2017), 59–84; and M. Kallioinen, ‘Inter-
communal institutions in medieval trade’, Economic History R., 70 (2017),
1131–52).
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Economic historians thus attach an increasing importance to the role
of urban elites and urban government, and recent scholarship suggests
that political historians are answering their call by investigating the
composition of urban government, as well as the expectations that urban
communities had from their rulers. The rapprochement between economic
history and political history is best illustrated by George Dameron’s
incisive analysis of Firenze, San Gimignano and Luca. Proceeding from
Amartya Sen’s claim that most food crises are not so much rooted in
underproduction as in socially skewed distributions of food resources
within a community, Dameron convincingly argues that the emergence
of urban republics in Tuscany largely revolved on the capacity of newly
emerging bourgeois elites (the so-called popolo) to manage the town’s
grain supplies in ways that were satisfactory to the lower classes of those
emerging city-states. Food supplies thus cemented the bond between
new elites and urban society, and, consequently, the issue weighed
heavily on the political agenda of city-states of centuries to come, as the
subsequent territorial expansion of city-states such as Firenze (Florence)
also largely revolved around meeting local demand for food security as
the conditio sine qua non of legitimate urban rule (‘Feeding the medieval
Italian city-state: grain, war, and political legitimacy in Tuscany, c. 1150 –
c. 1350’, Speculum, 92 (2017), 976–1019). This approach finds a useful
complement in Paolo Grillo’s analysis of the changing nature of urban
government in those Italian communes between 1250 and 1350. On the
one hand, his investigation confirms the classic claim of, amongst others,
WilliamBowsky, that Italian city-stateswere innovative in their precocious
development of a police force to monitor the streets. This provided an
alternative to established forms of self-help, in which repression of crime
revolved on shared cultural norms about mandatory assistance in case of
emergencies (the ‘hue and cry’ known as the ‘accurruomo’). On the other
hand, the article also shows the limits of that modernization paradigm
in revealing that self-help survived well into the fifteenth century as a
necessary complement to police forces that did not have sufficientmeans to
impose a rule of law on the town and its hinterland (‘Du cri à la patrouille:
l’ordre public dans les communes italiennes (1250–1350)’,Revue Historique,
682 (2017) 251–66).
This revision of the early history of the Italian city-states is supported
by similar research for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a period
that is traditionally imagined as the ‘stable’ result of the thirteenth-century
rise of the commune. Connecting to recent attempts to revise this image,
Marta Gravela reveals that the Piedmontese town of Turin, which came to
host a university around 1500 as well as the princely court of the dukes
of Savoy in the 1560s, saw a thorough restructuring of its ruling class
and its prerogatives. The coalition of urbanized noblemen (magnates)
and wealthy bourgeois (the ‘popolo’) – a typical arrangement in many
city-states – was replaced in the fifteenth century by a political elite that
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recruited its members among lawyers, merchants and bureaucrats that
did not always have long-established or durable ties to the Turin urban
community. This transition was not only a side-effect of the growing
integration of Turin in a greater polity, with its own regional elite that used
Turin as one of its many bases of operation, but also of a complex shift
in the social and legal attitudes of elite families. As prominent dynasties
were increasingly prone to opt for impartible inheritance protocols to
keep the family’s patrimony intact in the face of ever-greater financial
responsibilities as urban magistrates, the responsibility for the biological
reproduction of the family came to rest on an ever-smaller group of
individuals, and, in turn, this greatly increased the rhythm with which
elite families became extinct, thus making space for newcomers who often
had close ties with the emergent dukes of Savoy. The extinction of the old
cluster of families thus also meant the end of a distinct political milieu
(‘The primacy of patrimony: kinship strategies of the political elite of Turin
in the lateMiddle Ages (1340–1490)’,Continuity and Change, 32 (2017), 293–
321).
The research interests of specialists of the Italian peninsula is mirrored
by an impressive spate of studies on the heavily urbanized duchy of
Brabant in the Low Countries. In his incisive study of the nobility of the
rural district around Brussels, Mario Damen not only shows that many
of these noblemen were committed to urban politics – just as was the
case in many Italian towns – but also that the majority of those noblemen
were knights, and thus high-ranking noblemen, rather than esquires, or
lower-ranking noblemen, whereas in other parts of Brabant, the opposite
was true. This brings into focus another similarity with the case of Turin,
in that in Brussels too, the rise of strong princely states made its mark
on these elites that straddled town and countryside. Brussels was the
capital of the duchy, and also a favourite residence of the Valois dukes of
Burgundy, who also came to rule the duchy of Brabant. The close ties with
the prince, who conferred or withheld knighthood, explain the somewhat
distinct profile of the Brussels nobility, although Damen is careful to stress
that – just as Gravela argues for Turin – the social composition of the
groupwas largely shaped by the choices of nobles on themarriagemarket,
rather than by the prince (‘The knighthood in and around late medieval
Brussels’, J. ofMedievalHistory, 43 (2017), 255–84). The considerable overlap
between the nobility and the Brabantine urban elites observed byDamen is
expanded upon in the research of Valerie Vrancken. A close reading of the
discourse of the leaders of the revolt against the duke of Brabant in 1420–
21 reveals that the entanglement of rural and urban elites was mirrored
in a shared set of ideas and expectations about ‘the common good’ and
‘good governance’, as well as in a repertoire of concerted political actions
(‘United in revolt and discourse: urban and noble perceptions of “bad
government” in fifteenth-century Brabant (1420–1)’, J. of Medieval History,
43 (2017), 579–99).
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Thediscursive approach to Brabantine politics is closely alignedwith the
focus of Jelle Haemers and Chanelle Delameillieure on the contribution of
women and lower-ranking social groups in the public sphere. Proceeding
from the criminal records that survive for fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
Mechelen, Antwerp and Leuven (the three major Brabantine towns next
to Brussels), the authors intervene in the historiographical gap between
medievalists who see a declining role for women in late medieval society,
and early modernists who have long since recognized a substantial role
for women in popular politics. The Low Countries were a region with
a relative degree of freedom for women in the public sphere, and this
is reflected in the sources, as women are occasionally prosecuted for
insulting mayors, aldermen and so on. Haemers and Delameillieure are
careful to point out that the number of incidents remains stable over time,
so that the deteriorating position of women in the urban economy (female
labour and entrepreneurshipwas progressively restricted in the 1300–1600
era) did not end the widely recognized right of women to participate in
public debates about urban government. Both the form and the content
of the insults and comments that women shouted at urban officials
correspond closely to the political and discursive norms of the day, and
repression was not so much geared at the overstepping of gender norms
of what was thought to be appropriate behaviour for women as to the
potential threat to the public order that such comments posed. An added
bonus is the comparison with similar research for Bologna, Venice and
Florence, which suggests that the leeway for political action for women
was considerably greater in Netherlandish than in Italian towns, which
may mirror the more independent economic position that Netherlandish
women enjoyed (‘Women and contentious speech in fifteenth-century
Brabant’, Continuity and Change, 32 (2017), 323–47). Comparative analysis
of the differences and similarities between the heavily urbanized Italian
peninsula and the LowCountries has a long history, but recent scholarship
reveals that this approach still holds great promise to reveal the root causes
of political, social and economic change.
Both in Italy and in the Low Countries, the rise of the state is recognized
as a significant factor in the development of late medieval urban society,
and, of course, that story is not limited to the impact of princely courts
on the composition and stature of urban elites. The main preoccupation
of princely states was with war and taxes, and its implications for urban
history have also received attention in recent publications. An unusual
contribution is the detailed, event-centred reconstruction of the siege
of the French town of Harfleur by an English army in 1415 by Dan
Spencer, which happens to be the first siege with a significant role for
artillery bombardment. This makes for an interesting contribution to the
long-standing debate on the ‘Military Revolution’ and its implications
for urban society, because the experiments at Harfleur heralded great
changes in urban planning: in the centuries that followed, warfare would
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increasingly revolve around protracted and ever-larger sieges of urban
settlementswhichwere surroundedwith increasingly extensive bulwarks,
culminating in the well-known projects of Vauban and others (‘“The
scourge of the stones”: English gunpowder artillery at the siege of
Harfleur’, J. of Medieval History, 43 (2017), 59–73).
A well-known side effect of the Military Revolution was that the costs
of warfare rapidly increased so that even the wealthiest princes of Europe
could only hope to remain in the game if they established increasingly
extensive fiscal systems. This process has been charted in great detail
for France by John Bell Henneman and other scholars, who also became
increasingly attentive to the political fallout of increasing taxation for
urban and rural societies. Mathieu Caesar continues this fruitful line of
enquiry with a study of two episodes of unrest in two towns in the
borderlands between Brittany and the Poitou. The first point of interest is
that in this case, too, the revolts against royal taxationwere not somuch the
linear result of increased fiscal pressure, but rather shaped by expectations
about ‘reasonable taxation’ which were used by contemporaries as a
yardstick to evaluate the actions of royal officials, just as was the case with
grain supplies in the Italian city-states discussed by George Dameron. The
second point of interest is that – similar to what has been observed for
Italy and the Low Countries – the interactions between city dwellers and
neighbouring noblemen were much more intense than is usually allowed
in older scholarship that proceeded from a rigid dichotomy between
town and countryside (‘Legal uncertainty, resistance to royal taxation and
rural revolts in late medieval France: the case of Beauvoir-sur-Mer and
Bois-de-Céné (1480)’, J. of Medieval History, 43 (2017), 342–58). This point
was also made for England as early as 1988 by Rosemary Horrox, and
it underpins Sebastian Sobecki’s rich and amusing case-study: Sobecki
argues with great vigour that the activities and writings of the fourteenth-
century gentlemen Geoffrey Chaucer and John Gower must be situated
primarily in Southwark, a settlement that would eventually fuse with
London, and here, too, ambivalent attitudes towards royal taxation bring
to light various aspects of urban life (‘A Southwark tale: Gower, the 1381
poll tax, and Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales’, Speculum, 92 (2017), 607–29).
That rural and urban elites overlapped to a considerable extent, and
that they shared many assumptions about ‘good government’ and all
that pertained to it, should not lead to a new fallacy, according to which
historians assume that urban politics had nothing distinctive within a
given polity. An important warning in this respect comes from Chris
Fletcher, who carefully points out that medieval English towns, which
rarely counted 10,000 inhabitants or more, had a very different political
logic than that of the nobility and gentry. Barred from the rights and
means tomobilize armed forces, urban politicians had to treadmuchmore
carefully as only London was a significant military power in its own right.
In consequence, the contribution of English towns in the polity was more
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shaped by negotiation than that of more aristocratic actors. As a corollary
of this lack of military might, urban political elites also facedmore internal
opposition to their authority,which pushedurban governments tomonitor
carefully the circulation of rumours and complaints within the urban
community. Fletcher’s approach provides interesting similarities with the
discussed article of Paolo Grillo about the ‘accurruomo’ in Italian city-
states. The English equivalent – the so-called ‘hue and cry’, in which
clamour was used to make public claims to solidarity and assistance to
fellow townsmen, was increasingly subject to scrutiny by the mayor and
aldermen. Here, too, self-help and royal justice continued to operate in a
more complementary manner than earlier generations of historians liked
to think, but Fletcher reveals that the interplay between these two different
public order solutions was largely shaped by concerns about political
stability and the vested interests of established ruling classes (‘News,
noise, and the nature of politics in latemedieval English provincial towns’,
J. of British Studies, 56 (2017), 250–72).
The mastery over urban society is also what brings together a series of
articles and reviews on the uses and conceptualizations of urban space
in late medieval France. Urban governments were not only interested
in monitoring the public discourse and rumours in the towns, they also
actively tried to monitor urban space and its uses. On the one hand, city
councils were concerned with marginalizing activities that could stain the
town’s honour. This is revealed in great detail in Agathe Roby’s analysis
of the two-year-long deliberations of the aldermen of Toulouse about the
location of a new public brothel in the town after the demolishment of
the old brothel ‘La Grande Abbaye’ to make space for new city walls.
The well-documented attempt to find a ‘suitable spot’ – i.e. not too close
to a convent, a church or a school – reveals much about contemporary
preoccupations of aldermen to define morality in urban societies (‘De
la Grande Abbaye au Château Vert. L’installation d’un nouveau bordel
municipal à Toulouse au XVIe siècle’, Histoire Urbaine, 49 (2017), 17–35).
On the other hand, urban elites also tried to develop landmarks that
embodied the collective urban identity – as defined by those in power – as
a rallying point for the various social groups in town. These landmarks
were not only secular (e.g. belfries) but also often religious in nature.
For France, much has been done in this respect by those medievalists
who elaborated on André Vauchez’s concept of ‘civic religion’ as ‘a
collection of religious phenomena – cultic, devotional and institutional –
in which civil power plays a determining role, principally through the
action of local and municipal authorities’ to legitimize urban government
(La réligion civique à l’epoque médiévale et moderne (chrétienté et islam) (Rome,
1995), 1–2). Yet, recent publications reveal that scholars are also moving
beyond the boundaries of the paradigm. Fabienne Henryot presents an
interesting alternative to Vauchez’s stress on the agency of urban elites
with her analysis of the Lyon cloister that hosted the last resting place
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of St Bonavonture. In this case, the initiative to use the saint’s cult to
reinforce contemporary political arrangements did not rest with the Lyon
aldermen (they only stepped in in the seventeenth century), but with
the French crown, so that this particular locus of worship doubled as an
ideological umbilical cord between the French crown and Lyon as the
second city of the kingdom (‘Les Lyonnais et saint Bonavonture (fin du
XVe–XVIIIe siècles), Revue Historique, 682 (2017), 267–96). Next to case-
studies that overturn expectations about the evolution in urban ideological
practices from the local to the ‘national’, there is also the much broader
reassessment of the concept of ‘urban space’ in French historiography
in the mutual reviews by Dominique Iogna-Prat and Florian Mazel as
the respective authors of the monographs Cité de Dieu, cité des hommes.
L’Église et l’architecture de la société, 1200–1500 (Paris, 2016), and L’évêque et le
territoire. L’invention médiévale de l’espace (Ve–XIIIe siècle) (Paris, 2016) (both
reviews are published in Annales. Histoire. Sciences sociales, 72 (2017), 99–
107 and 109–20). Read together, both reviews present an incisive overview
of the achievements and agenda for future research for scholars of the so-
called ‘spatial turn’ for medieval urban society.
Last but certainly not least is Carla Roth’s incisive essay on obscene
humour in St Gallen, a town that came to belong to the Swiss Confederacy.
Proceeding from the well-known Commentationes of Johannes Rüttinger,
she not only reconstructs the cultural framework in which jokes about
sex and defecation were funny to contemporaries, but she also adds an
innovative twist to the burgeoning body of scholarship of the history
of humour by developing a distinctly social approach to these cultural
performances.Whereas older scholarship usually assumes that these jokes
all fulfil a basic and immutable social function, that is, the release of
frustration that stems from either aggression or desire, Roth points out
that these jokes had complex social lives. They circulated in a surprisingly
wide array of social contexts, ranging from the humanists gathered at the
university to the textile artisans on the shop floors of many towns, and
because they were tailored with great precision to each social context, they
allowed the jokers not so much to vent their frustrations, but to display
values that were prized in a sixteenth-century town of scholars and textile
workers, namely masculinity, vigour and erudition (‘Obscene humour,
gender, and sociability in sixteenth-century St Gallen’, Past and Present,
234 (2017), 39–70). This remarkable contribution is typical, I think, for the
growing entanglement of social, economic, political and cultural history
as the dominant trend in urban historiography as evinced in the articles
published in 2017.
1500–1800
Social inequality is an important topic in academia today, particularly since
the publication of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century.
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The latest issue of Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis looks
more closely at inequality in the early modern Low Countries. In the
introduction, Jutta Bolt and Wouter Ryckbosch synthesize the major
studies of Kuznets, Piketty and Atkinson (‘Introduction: inequality in
the Low Countries’, Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis,
14 (2017), 5–9). In 1955, Kuznets introduced his famous inverted U
hypothesis, whereby inequality first rises and subsequently falls with
growing average (per capita) income. However, Jan-Luiten van Zanden
has questioned such a straightforward causal connection, as inequality
in pre-industrial Holland was also rising in times of economic boom.
Moreover, it has been argued that the Kuznets curve does not hold for
the evolution in income and inequality in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries. Therefore, Bolt and Ryckbosch stress the need to
gather asmuch historical data on inequality as possible. Krisiof Dombrecht
and Wouter Ryckbosch focus on the sixteenth-century polder region –
north of Bruges – to tease out a link between inequality and economic
transformations (‘Wealth inequality in a time of transition: coastal Flanders
in the sixteenth century’, Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis,
14 (2017), 63–84). Farms became much larger and more commercialized.
In the long run, social inequality soared, but it was anything but a linear
process. Some episodes saw a levelling of the income distribution. The
trend can be explained by looking at the changing nature of wealth. From
the late fifteenth century onwards, the number of households with real
estate fell, while the commons were increasingly subdivided and sold to a
small upper-crust of wealthy farmers, noble, clerical or urban landlords.
The causal relationship between economic growth and inequality is
also questioned in Guido Alfani and Francesco Ammanati’s latest article
(‘Long-term trends in economic inequality: the case of the Florentine state,
c. 1300–1800’, Economic History R., 70 (2017), 1072–102). In Tuscany, social
inequality decreased after the Black Death (1348–49), but it rose steadily
during the early modern period. A long-term analysis is also by Ulrich
Pfister, who looks at big data on prices and wages to sketch the evolution
of real wages in Germany on the long run (‘The timing and pattern of
real wage divergence in pre-industrial Europe: evidence from Germany,
c. 1500–1800’, Economic History R, 70 (2017), 701–29). Pfister demonstrates
that the divergence happened in two stages. In the first stage, around the
mid-seventeenth century, themercantile and financial rim of theNorth Sea
moved away from its hinterland, while in the second stage, in the early
eighteenth century, Germany took a ‘third way’ between the booming
economy of (southern) England and the stasis of Italian states. However,
the evolution of commodity prices and – to a certain extent – real wages
ran strikingly in parallel in these regions despite their limited market
integration.
Disasters, vulnerability and resilience remain important subjects in
urban history. Due to the survival of a unique source – the detailed journal
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of patients of the Chester Infirmary – and a masterly combination with
John Haygarth’s census records, Simon Szreter has been able to produce
detailed estimates of the incidence of syphilis in Chester and its rural
surroundings in the late eighteenth century. These figures were compared
with estimates on venereal diseases from 1911–12 (‘Treatment rates for the
pox in early modern England: a comparative estimate of the prevalence
of syphilis in the city of Chester and its rural vicinity in the 1770s’,
Continuity and Change, 32 (2017), 183–223). Due to the peculiar symptoms,
contemporaries labelled this phase of the disease as the pox. Hence, it was
possible to produce age-specific estimates of the extent to which adults
of each sex had been treated for the pox, by the age of 35. Apparently, a
staggering 8 per cent of the population of Chester had been infected with
syphilis before their 35th birthday, against barely 1 per cent in the city’s
rural surroundings.
Risk also looms large in Jeroen Puttevils andMarc Deloof’s latest article,
which analyses the extremely rare account books of an Antwerp marine
insurance broker (see ‘Marketing and pricing risk in marine insurance in
sixteenth-century Antwerp’, J of Economic History, 77 (2017), 796–837). In
their impressive case-study, they sketch the well-functioning insurance
market in mid-sixteenth century Antwerp which, both in scale and scope,
could easily competewith other insurance hubs such as Venice, Genoa and
Burgos. Key features were the openness of the market and the extensive
mercantile liberties, which enabled even small-scale traders to turn to the
insurance market, where occasional and more permanent subcontractors
were active. The premium rates charged were largely determined by the
underlying risk factors, which seems to indicate that those taking out
insurance relied on sensible risk management strategies.
Given the current crisis of Syrian refugees (amongst others), it comes
as no surprise that historical research is also heavily geared towards
migration, integration and regulation in the past. In ‘Comment être
vénitien. Identification des immigrants et “droits d’habiter” à Venise au
XVIe siècle’ (Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 64 (2017), 69–
92) Rosa Salzberg and Claire Judde de Larivière examine how Venetian
migration policy changed in the sixteenth century, when the economic
and political power of the republic waned. First of all, there was a cry for
more state control and regulation. For a long time, the city administration
had simply relied on the cadastre oral – or the lore in neighbourhoods,
where details on the place of origin, occupation, family situation and
reputation were meticulously – yet orally – registered to identify the
forestieri (foreigners). Inclusion and integration was primarily negotiated
at the local level of neighbourhoods, streets and workshops. In the early
sixteenth century, the Venetian state came up with a new set of rules to
monitor the influx of migrants more closely. Keepers of osterie (inns) and
albergarie (lodging houses) were forced to keep detailed registers of their
customers. These lists had to be handed in at the Giustizia Nuova. In 1545,
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the state tightened its grip even more by introducing the bolletino. Upon
arrival, every foreigner had to fill in a form, regardless of the length of
stay, and submit it to the proper officials. In the meantime, the concept
of forestieri was changing radically. Even though city administrations
used the term to label anyone from outside Venice, the popolani only
used it for itinerant and unknown strangers. More settled migrants were
tagged with their place of origin. In the sixteenth century, the fault line
between Venetians and forestieri became clearer, as the government –
spurred by religious motivations – forced some minorities to live within
the confines of several enclaves such as the Foncaco dei Tedeshi (Germans),
the Ghetto (Jews) and the Fondaco dei Turchi (Muslims), where they could
be monitored more efficiently.
Less successful were the efforts of the Ottoman rulers to keep the
immigration of the bekâr – literally bachelors – at bay. In ‘Invisible city:
Istanbul’smigrants and the politics of space’ (Eighteenth-Century Studies, 50
(2017), 173–93), ShirineHamadeh describes how Istanbul was beleaguered
by an army of thousands of male migrant workers in the eighteenth
century, who swelled the ranks of the casual labourers, odd-jobbers,
pedlars and beggars. Housing in particular was a matter of concern, as
the bekâr odalari (bachelor lodging houses) not only mushroomed around
commercial areas and the harbour, where their tenants were typically
employed, but also thrived in the malhalle (residential quarters), where
they were a thorn in the flesh of more settled citizens. Frequent purges
and campaigns, whereby bekâr odalariwere torn down or set ablaze by the
government, were to no avail, as the shacks, hovels and barracks were
eventually rebuilt. Hamadeh claims that the resilience of these migrant
communities was highly dependent on their successful integration in
local communities. Newcomers turned to their odabasi (innkeeper), hanci
(headmaster) or employer for support, while these locals saw immigrants
as a highly lucrative source of income. Connections with Janissaries and
other army units were also vital, as they provided all sorts of opportunities
for work in construction, transport, coffee houses and other sectors, that
were beyond control of the guilds. On the other hand, the bekâr provided
the sheer manpower – not to say cannon fodder – when Janissaries
unleashed their umpteenth revolt against the sultan. Due to these power-
wielding patrons, the policy of the Ottoman administration to remove the
bekârs from even the most residential quarters of Istanbul were ultimately
doomed.
In his latest article, Peter King questions the widely held assumption
that migrants were singled out and treated more harshly by early modern
police forces and judges (‘Immigrant communities, the police, and the
courts in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century London’, Crime,
Histoire et Sociétés, 20 (2016), 1–30). In his article, King masterly combines
a qualitative micro-storia of one Old Bailey homicide case from 1799 with
a more serial analysis of 12,000 entries from the Newgate Calendars. From
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the evidence of accusations, verdicts and punishments, it appears that
migrant communities were rarely if ever discriminated against by the
judges and jurors of the Old Bailey. Foreign suspects – from Europe and
other parts of the worlds, but also from Wales, Scotland and Ireland –
were not necessarily treated more harshly than Londoners born and bred.
Even more surprisingly, the same holds true for Jews and black people.
However, there was one exception to the rule: Irish migrants were much
more likely to be indicted for murders, assault and battery, riot, rape
and other violent crimes than other offenders. King argues that these
differences hint at some deeply entrenched prejudices against the Irish,
which echoed the communis opinio that they were more prone to violence.
It remains a moot question whether these discriminatory trials were the
result of long-held prejudices or rather the outcome of recent political
turmoil and – more especially – the United Irishmen Rebellion of 1798.
It is beyond doubt, however, that the criminal justice system and its main
officials – police, magistrates and judges – harboured some hard-nosed
prejudices against Irish immigrants, even if discrimination against other
ethnic groups was conspicuously absent.
Ever since Keith Luria launched his famous hypothesis, the way in
which various confessional groups more or less peacefully co-existed in
early modern cities has been vehemently debated. In ‘Religious conflict
and civic identity: battles over the sacred landscape of Montpellier’
(Past and Present, 237 (2017), 53–91), Barbara Diefendorf shatters the rosy
picture of Catholics and Huguenots living together in perfect harmony
in Montpellier. Frequent outbursts of religious violence demonstrate
that the oecumenical co-existence was but a thin veneer, while,
underneath, the religious tensions festered on. Taking a spatial turn,
Diefendorf maps the recurring conflicts, whereby space was symbolically
marked as sacred by the consecration of churches, processions and other
powerful rituals, but also fiercely contested through bouts of iconoclasm.
Sacred space – both for Catholics and Protestants – served as a constant
and bitter reminder of old enmities, which, even in times of peaceful co-
existence, sparked off mutual antagonism. Militant Huguenots razed the
Catholic churches and monasteries when they came to power after the
Edict of Nantes (1598) turned them into Protestant temples, sabotaged –
or even banned – processions and removed the Magestat antiqua (Black
Madonna) from the city seal. When royal power was restored after 1622,
Catholics reclaimed their sacred space by organizing processions, building
new churches, erecting crosses and – ultimately – by pulling down the
Protestant Grand Temple in 1682.
Religious co-existence – or rather the sheer lack of it – is also an issue in
Max Deardorff’s ‘The ties that bind: intermarriage between Moriscos and
Old Christians in early modern Spain, 1526–1614’, J. of Family History, 42
(2017), 250–70). Deardoff analyses marriages between so-called Old and
New Christians. The latter – also tagged as conversos, Moriscos or nuevos
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convertidos de moros in legal terms – were former Muslims, who had been
converted to Catholicism in the slipstream of the conquest of the Nasrid
kingdom of Granada in 1492. In the sixteenth century, the Spanish state
still looked askance at these conversos, as they stuck to their old traditions,
spoke Arabic, wore ‘Moorish’ styles of clothing, honoured culinary taboos
or remained faithful to their ostensibly Islamic rituals. These crypto-
Muslims were expelled in recurrent purges and pogroms, leading to
the final ethnic cleansing in 1609–14, when hundreds of thousands of
Moriscos were banished from Spain. Marriage with an Old Christian
was, as Deardorff proposes, a crucial argument to avert expulsion, as
the Spanish government saw mixed weddings as an important tool to
integrate former Muslim minorities. Hence, petitions of conversos, who
stood in fear of expulsion, focused on their Christian lifestyle, on their
active role in fighting theMuslim rebellion of theAlpujarres (1568–70) and,
above all, on their marriage with faithful Old Christians. In most cases,
the last argument proved decisive to avert banishment. Deardorff also
points to fascinating gender differences. Whereas female conversos, who
were married to Old Christian husbands, did not need extra arguments,
Moriscos wedded to Old Christian wives had to provide additional proof
of their Christian life. These differences echo deeply entrenched ideas
about patriarchal hierarchy.
Emily Michelson looks more closely at the co-existence between
Catholics and Jews in early modern Rome through the lens of
conversionary preaching in ‘Conversionary preaching and the Jews in
early modern Rome’, Past and Present, 235 (2017), 68–104. Every Saturday,
Roman Jews were processed from the ghetto to the Santissima Trinità
dei Pellegrini (Confraternity of the Most Holy Trinity), where they were
treated to an endless sermon. Through a forensically detailed analysis
of the Scripture, Talmud, Kaballah and other canonical texts, the prelate
tried to convince his audience that the Jewish interpretation was false
and faulty. Michelson argues, however, that Jews were not the only –
nor the most important – audience, as these sermons always attracted
a crowd of Christian listeners. Therefore, conversion of the lost Hebrew
sheep was not the principal aim; it was much more important to convince
one’s own flock of the regained vigour and dynamism of the Counter-
Reformation church. In this way, conversionary preaching was part of a
much wider programme of sermons, processions, pilgrimages and other
devotions, which had to demonstrate the unmistakable health and glory
of the Baroque church. As they were the oldest opponents, Jews were a
rhetorically more rewarding target than Muslims, Protestants and other
foes.
Thanks to the bodily turn, urban historians have increasingly
turned their attention to the more physical dimensions of everyday
life in early modern Europe. In ‘”Facing identity” in a ‘”faceless”
society: physiognomy, facial appearances, and identity perception in
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eighteenth-century London’ (Cultural and Social History, 14 (2017), 137–
53), Kathryn Woods details the ups and downs of physiognomic theory
and practice in early modern London. Even though the idea that facial
expressions and features – a big nose, bright eyes, heavy eyebrows – were
a telltale indicator of one’s character was widespread in the seventeenth
century, it was challenged by the new ideal of politeness, which urged
people to look beyond outward appearances and looks. Yet, in the
late eighteenth century, physiognomy was back again, as a flood of
treatise and observations evidence. Woods explains this evolution by
referring to some sweeping societal changes. Urbanization – London’s
population had by 1750 risen to a staggering 750,000 – created the uneasy
sense of an anonymous and ‘faceless’ mob; an anxiety which was also
fuelled by fading social boundaries. In this climate, physiognomy gave
something to grasp hold of. The bodily turn is also tangible in Matthew
McCormack’s newest article on ‘Boots, material culture and Georgian
masculinities’ (Social History, 42 (2017), 461–79); in this case, literally,
as McCormack handled several specimens to say something about the
changing experience and feel of wearing boots in early modern Britain.
With this material culture approach, he questions the idea that men’s
footwear was – in stark contrast with women’s decorative, flimsy and
impractical shoes – predominantly plain, sturdy and functional. In reality,
boots evolved from the stiff, bulky and chafing jackboots which were
popular in the early eighteenth century, to the much more supple, soft
and elegant Wellington in the early nineteenth century. McCormack’s
claim that boots were much more than functional gear is also endorsed
by eighteenth-century owners’ obsession for polishing, with a clear
preference for shiny black shoe-polish. Boots also emphasizedmasculinity
through their military association, but also by their physical effect on the
body, which drew the eye to the shape of the man’s leg and his crutch.
Bodily features also loom large in the Commentationes of Johannes
Rütiner, a well-heeled citizen, who recorded all sorts of obscene humour
in sixteenth-century Switzerland. Carla Roth draws on this unique
manuscript to provide fresh perspective in the ongoing debate about
laughter in early modern Europe (‘Obscene humour, gender, and
sociability in sixteenth-century St. Gallen’, Past and Present, 234 (2017), 39–
70). First of all, it becomes clear that sexual and scatological jokes were
all but a guilty pleasure, which had to be read in secret and recited in
hush voices. Rütiner frequently heard these obscene quips in inns and
taverns, but was also keen to repeat them to pepper the conversation with
his intellectual, humanist friends. Sexual and scatological jests, whereby
sperm, faeces and urine were standard ingredients, even served as a sort
of ‘admission ticket’ to these elite circles. Moreover, the Commentationes
reveal how malleable and adaptable early modern humour actually was.
Facetiae and other printed collectionsmay have served as an inspiration for
humour, but the witty homo ioci plenus rarely if ever stuck to this material,
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but skilfully tailored their jokes to their audience and the circumstances.
Last but not least, Roth challenges thewidely held idea thatmost jokes had
amisogynous baseline. In fact, most obscene humour focused onmenwho
were unable to control their own bodily functions, leading to unforeseen
eruptions of sperm, excrements and other fluids. By way of inversion,
these jokes substantiated masculinity.
Time awareness in early modern cities has witnessed a revived interest
lately. In her latest article, AnneMurphy takes a closer look at the business
archives of the Bank of England – and, more particularly, at the reports
of the Committee of Inspection – to assess the importance of the clock
in the everyday operational management of the bank (‘Clock-watching:
work and working time at the late eighteenth-century Bank of England’,
Past and Present, 1 (2017), 243–50). Murphy shows how virtually every
aspect of the bank’s corporate culture was imbued by a strong horological
awareness. Clerks were kept in line by strict working hours and fines
for lateness. They worked from nine till five, six days in a week. Public
holidayswere scarce, while Saint-Monday (Mondaywas, by tradition, part
of the weekend) was never observed. Moreover, the clerks’ answers to
the committee suggest that they frequently worked against the clock and
were familiar with time pressure. Most of them also had a side-job. After
five, they worked as brokers, speculators or merchants to maximize their
income, which seems to hint at de Vries’ industrious revolution. Murphy
not only challenges Thompson’s black-and-white opposition between pre-
industrial and industrial time awareness with her analysis of the Bank’s
inspection reports, but also uncovers some interesting social differences.
Whereas the clerks worked excessively long hours, the more senior staff
were more laidback. They slipped away shortly after three, which seems
to suggest that they preferredmore leisure time above a larger pay-packet.
In recent years, early modern apprenticeship and learning on the job
has drawn a revived interest. In his latest article, Ruben Schalk looks
at 400 orphan apprentices from Dutch cities. Despite their high degree
of mobility, these orphans were seen as a cheap labour force by the
guilds (‘From orphan to artisan: apprenticeship careers and contract
enforcement in The Netherlands before and after the guild abolition’,
Economic History R., 70 (2017), 730–57). Masters ceaselessly recruited new
apprentices, while the need to stipulate the nature of employment in a
contract weakened. In Leiden, most of these orphans ended up in the
textile industry, where guild-regulation was low or non-existent. They
were mainly recruited for low-skilled labour and slipped away as soon
as an apprenticeship in a guild-controlled craft opened up. Flexibility
in apprenticeship in other parts of Europe is also stressed in the latest
contribution of Ruben Schalk, Patrick Wallis, Clare Crowston and Claire
Lemercier (‘Failure or flexibility? Apprenticeship training in premodern
Europe’, J. of Interdisciplinary History, 48 (2017), 131–58). They emphasize
the volatility of work: youths – including apprentices and journeymen –
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came and went, roved from one place to another, moved from master
to master, and – most likely – frequently switched occupations. Schalk
et al. draw a compelling analysis of the individual careers of these
youths from their initial apprenticeship to the final settlement as a
master in Amsterdam, Leiden, Lyon or Shrewsbury by a meticulous
comparison between the initial articles of apprenticeship and the final
mastership. Instability was the buzzword. Although cities witnessed an
enormous efflux of apprentices, none of the guilds attempted to enforce the
completion of the contracts, which suggests that masters and apprentices
were well aware of the fact that their labour contract could come to an
untimely end.
Labour is also an issue in ‘Gender, life cycle, and family “strategies”
among the poor: the Barcelona workhouse, 1762–1805’ (Economic History
R., 70 (2017), 810–36) by Montserrat Carbonell-Esteller and Julie Marfany,
who question the link between poor relief and family strategies.
Traditionally, historians separate north-western Europe, where nuclear
families thrived, fromMediterranean and eastern Europe, where extended
families prevailed. It is often assumed that family ties were much stronger
in the latter. Marfany and Carbonell use the records of the Barcelona
workhouse to provide chapter-and-verse on the origins, ages, gender and
marital status of the inmates. Furthermore, their analysis looks closely at
the family ties of these paupers. Apparently, the workhouse was over-
whelmingly populated by young, male singles from outside Barcelona.
Yet, the institution was also used as a sort of (urban) substitute for (rural)
kin by migrant families, who dealt with short-term crises. Marfany and
Carbonell also stress the importance of training on the job offered in the
workhouse, which enabled youths to enter the urban labour market.
Ever since Oscar Gelderblom published his book Cities of Commerce,
the discussion on the importance of institutions to facilitate international
trade rages through economic history. In the introduction of the special
issue on the topic in Continuity and Change, Alain Wijffels introduces the
new concept of conflict management – as opposed to conflict resolution –
as an analytical tool to study commercial clashes of interest through
the lens of legal institutions (‘Introduction: commercial quarrels – and
how (not) to handle them’, Continuity and Change, 32 (2017), 1–9). New
research suggests that the legal power of urban governments to create the
necessary conditions for international trade was rather limited. Focusing
on Portuguese merchants in England, Normandy and Flanders, Flávio
Miranda examines potential differences in laws, rules and institutions
in these different regions (‘Conflict management in western Europe: the
case of the Portuguese merchants in England, Flanders and Normandy,
1250–1500’, Continuity and Change, 32 (2017), 11–36). Drawing on hundreds
of records – ranging from safe-conducts and petitions to prosecutions –
Miranda’s research rather emphasizes the role of diplomacy in conflict
management and the lasting importance of privileges.
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Equally influenced by the New Institutional Economics, Justyna Wubs-
Mrozewicz claims that the medieval and early modern Hanseatic League
was much more than an organizational structure; it developed all sorts
of procedures for mediation and arbitration between disputing parties
(‘The late medieval and early modern Hanse as an institution of conflict
management’, Continuity and Change, 32 (2017), 59–84). The Hanse created
added value for themembership of individual traders and cities by serving
as an effective institution for conflict management, which transcended
the patchwork of political and judicial backgrounds. Mika Kallioinen
also provides an interesting case-study on conflict management and legal
institutions by examining the correspondence between Finish and foreign
city councils in the late Middle Ages and early modern period (‘Inter-
communal institutions in medieval trade‘, Economic History R., 70 (2017),
1131–52). Its focus on a region outside the well-studied core of western
Europe provides fresh perspective. Kallioinen takes a closer look at an
institutionwhich prevailed in the Baltic area and could best be described as
an inter-urban tool for conciliations.When a dispute arose, mediation took
place between the city councils rather than between individual merchants.
Post-1800
The increasing popularity of urban living is one of the most striking devel-
opments of our time, radically transforming residential, consumption and
investment patterns. It is only during the last three decades that major
western cities have come to experience substantial demographic growth
again. From the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, most cities were undergoing
an unprecedented loss of both residents and jobs. Simultaneously, local
governments were initiating redevelopment schemes meant to replace an
outdated housing stock with modern tower blocks, office buildings and
shopping centres. While urban historians have come to label this era of
rapid decline and comprehensive redevelopment as the urban crisis, a
remarkable backlash swelled in neighbourhoods that were either slated
for demolition or neglected by planners and investors. Here, the changing
demographic and economic tides opened up new prospects and spaces
for a rapidly growing cohort of artists, students and young professionals,
setting in motion a process we nowadays refer to as gentrification.
Yet despite gentrification’s significance for how and where people
live nowadays, little is known about its roots. The pioneering stages
of the process, first observed in American cities during the 1950s, are
usually treated by geographers as a mere afterthought, while historians
have only recently forayed into the field of gentrification. Qualitative
research is lacking in particular. According to Suleiman Osman in
‘Gentrification matters’, J. of Urban History, 43 (2017), 172–9, this should
come as no surprise, as gentrification is only a recent phenomenon and
urban historians dislike the contemporary hype surrounding an issue
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S096392681800007X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Vakgroep Politieke Wetenschappen, UGent, on 16 Apr 2018 at 13:36:53, subject to the
368 Urban History
that is difficult to define. Still, at least in the American context, Osman
discerns an increasing historical awareness, and calls for his colleagues
to develop gentrification studies into a relevant subfield of urban history.
In ‘Gentrification 1.0: urban transformations in late nineteenth-century
Berlin’, Urban Studies (OnlineFirst), Philipp Reick takes this call one
historical step further by investigating gentrification processes in Berlin
during the late nineteenth century, employing historical address books
to portray uneven geographies of inner-city neighbourhood change.
In his challenging contribution, Reick comes to the conclusion that
contemporary gentrification dynamics are resuming a multidirectional
dynamic of displacement, urging urban historians to extend their temporal
and spatial scopes. In this respect, an excellent early endeavour was last
year’s special issue of Informationen zur Modernen Stadtgeschichte, 48 (2017),
which focused on spatial urban inequalities.
Recent gentrification processes are often attributed to the rise of the
creative class; a city-oriented social stratum involved with the knowledge-
based production of ideas, technologies and content. In ‘“Brain magnet”:
Research Triangle Park and the origins of the creative city, 1953–1965’,
Journal of Urban History, 43 (2017), 470–92, Sayf Cummings historicizes
the emergence of a creative class in North Carolina’s Research Triangle
metropolitan area. Cummings convincingly demonstrates how as early as
the 1950s a local growth coalition made up of academics, businesspeople
and state officials lured not only investments or jobs, but also an educated
class of workers to the surroundings of Durham and Raleigh. In a special
edition on the importance of knowledge transfers in central and eastern
European cities between 1880 and 1945, ‘“Emerging cities”: knowledge
and urbanization in Europe’s borderlands 1880–1945’, J. of Urban History,
43 (2017), 575–87, Eszter Gantner and Heidi Hein-Kircher also draw our
attention to the historical significance of local science hubs. They propose
to shift our focus from western metropolises to the emerging cities in
Europe’s borderlands, where academics were deriving valuable technical
and social knowledge from themodalities, strategies and practices of rapid
urbanization processes.
The notion of a creative class was popularized by Richard Florida,
whose ideas on successful cities became guiding policy principles over
the last 15 years. Yet 2017 saw the publication of The New Urban Crisis,
in which Florida demonstrates how the same forces that powered the
revitalization of large conurbations are now turning against themselves,
leading to issues of increasing unaffordability and displacement. Indeed,
the enormous popularity of urban living is one of the most striking global
developments of our time, radically transforming residential patterns,
forms of consumption and cycles of real estate investment. Obviously, the
title of Florida’s latest book is a wink at the urban crisis proper, which is
also the theme of a special section by Themis Chronopoulos and Jonathan
Soffer, ‘Introduction. After the urban crisis: New York and the rise of
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inequality’, J. of Urban History, 43 (2017), 855–63. Similar to Kim Philipp-
Fein’s 2017 book Fear City, the authors assert that New York’s long-term
structural inequalities were exacerbated by the politics of austerity and
neoliberalism, which were implemented after the city’s near bankruptcy
of 1975.
How New Yorkers coped with declining infrastructure, services,
standards of living and increasing inequality stands at the core of Benjamin
Holtzman’s and Reiko Hillyer’s contributions, respectively ‘“I am not
co-op!”: The struggle over middle-class housing in 1970s New York’
and ‘The Guardian Angels: law and order and citizen policing in New
York City’, J. of Urban History, 43 (2017), 864–85 and 886–914. Holtzman
focuses on the 1970s struggles between city officials, the real estate
industry and those tenants who preferred rent-regulated housing over
homeownership, notwithstanding the profits they could potentially make.
Tenants achieved considerable success in challenging the notion that
ownershipwould benefit themiddle classes, butwere soon sandwiched by
top-down gentrification policies and an increasing grassroots acceptance
of conversions by tenants who thought to benefit economically. Hillyer
draws our attention to another consequence ofNewYork’s urban crisis: the
rise of the Guardian Angels, a community patrol organization of mostly
black and Latino youths founded in 1979. Their theatre of operations
mainly concerned the city’s subway system, which had fallen on hard
times due to the slashing of services and personnel layoffs. According
to Hillyer, the Angels were an ambivalent reflection of a desire for
community control and self-determination as well as the widespread
hysteria about a city out of control and calls for more aggressive policing,
which were mainly coming from conservative forces.
The driving force of the post-war urban crisis was suburbanization.
In a fascinating and meticulously researched article on the Asian
American suburbs of Los Angeles, ‘Design assimilation in suburbia: Asian
Americans, built landscapes, and suburban advantage in Los Angeles’s
San Gabriel Valley since 1970’, J. of Urban History, 43 (2017), 332–71, Becky
Nicolaides and James Zarsadiaz explore how Asian residents melded
their homeland memories, the American dream of comfort and luxury
and prevalent architectural neo-styles, emerging as an affluent suburban
middle class. Over the course of 2017, suburbanization also loomed large
in this journal. In the original ‘Suburbanization and cultural change: the
case of club cricket in Surrey, 1870–1939’, Urban History, 44 (2017), 44–
68, Duncan Stone examines how and why cricket spread throughout the
south-east of England, demonstrating the cultural importance of elite
sports in shaping class identities. In a more orthodox approach, Michael
McGreevy investigates suburbanization in ‘Suburban growth in Adelaide,
SouthAustralia, 1850–1930: speculation and economic opportunity’,Urban
History, 44 (2017), 208–30, as the growth of self-contained communities.
One major growth incentive was the availability of large backyard lots,
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where married women in particular could generate produce and income
for their families.
Obviously, suburbanization was facilitated by transportation networks
connecting new developments with older settlements. In ‘Transport
planning as suggested in John Claudius Loudon’s 1829 plan for London’,
Planning Perspectives, 32 (2017), 271–80, Patrice Bouche demonstrates how
transport planning and decentralization in John Loudon’s 1829 expansion
scheme for London were aimed at creating a socially inclusive city,
providing Londoners of all classes with a freely accessible and innovative
network of carriageways and railways. Such ideas travelled fast in the
British empire of the Victorian era. Albeit in a less idealistic way, railway
planning was extremely important to the expansion of provincial colonial
cities such as Delhi, as Raghav Kishore shows in ‘Planning, traffic and
the city: railway development in colonial Delhi, c. 1899–1905’, Urban
History, 44 (2017), 253–69. Kishore demonstrates how the local planning
process was driven by visions of the city as a space for the circulation
of commercial traffic on the one hand and an increasingly authoritative
rule by the British Raj on the other. In another contribution on urban
planning in India, ‘Communitarian regionalism in India: how lessons from
theNewDeal Greenbelt programme translated to postwar India’, Planning
Perspectives, 32 (2017), 225–47, Laurel Harbin and Kristin Larsen examine
how and why American ideas about greenbelts were exported to post-
colonial India and adapted to local needs through the input of indigenous
knowledge, in which the famous planner Albert Mayer played a pivotal
role.
Underpinning the planning principles of sound transportation net-
works, greenbelts and the marriage of town and country were the ideals
of Ebenezer Howard, who in his 1898 Garden Cities of Tomorrow proposed
to export the people and jobs of congested cities to self-contained new
towns in the open countryside, free of industrial pollution, overcrowding
and overpriced land values. Such thinking was blown up to enormous
proportions during the post-war era, when the growing affluence enabled
planners to envision ever grander schemes and modernist thinking
reached its zenith. Similar to James C. Scott’s groundbreaking Seeing
like a State, an indictment of how central governments force legibility
on their subjects through planning, Renato Leão Rego examines the
massive colonization and settlement scheme for Brazil’s Amazonian
territory in ‘Shaping an urban Amazonia: “a planner’s nightmare”’,
Planning Perspectives, 32 (2017), 249–70. During the 1970s, the Brazilian
government’s attempts to attract people to the hinterlands led to a
failed marriage between city and country due to infrastructural and
environmental constraints, agricultural disappointments and misguided
policy-making. The city–country binary is also the central theme in Jeremy
Krikler’s ‘Rural masters and urban militants in early twentieth-century
South Africa’, Historical J., 60 (2017), 771–93, in which historians are urged
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to pay more attention to the bearing of class interests upon the responses
of rural landowners to urban movements.
At the same time as Brazil was cultivating its indigenous territories,
American and British cities were reclaiming their own land, albeit with
different means and objectives. Still, some planners saw no problem in
comparing deforestation with redeveloping slum areas, or as New York’s
chief planner Robert Moses once infamously said: ‘You can draw any
kind of pictures you like on a clean slate and indulge your every whim
in the wilderness in laying out a New Delhi, Canberra and Brasilia, but
when you operate in an overbuilt metropolis you have to hack your way
with a meat axe.’ The post-war rise in car ownership influenced where
people lived, worked and consumed, thereby redefining the boundaries
between city and countryside. Solutionswere sought to accommodate cars
in central urban areas, not only by cutting away existing developments
such as Moses proposed, but also by adapting street life to the dangers
of increasing car traffic. In the illuminating article ‘Play streets: women,
children and the problem of urban traffic, 1930–1970’, Social History,
42 (2017), 233–56, Krista Cowman traces the pre-war emergence of so-
called play streets, which were closed to through traffic most of the day.
Cowman convincingly argues that working-class street sociability was
strongly connected to children’s play. Despite their initial success and
governmental support, the dazzling increase in car ownership of the 1960s
and shift towards indoor play led to the demise of this bottom-up planning
intervention.
Soon after the first urban expressways were planned, inner-city
residents raised their voices by filing petitions and taking to the streets. In
1970sHouston, less orthodoxways of protesting came into vogue amongst
members of both white and black communities, as investigated by Kyle
Shelton in ‘Building a better Houston: highways, neighborhoods, and
infrastructural citizenship in the 1970s’, J. of Urban History, 43 (2017), 421–
44. Coining the term ‘infrastructural citizenship’, Shelton demonstrates
how Houstonians presented their living environment as a space of
negotiation over what the city was and would become, connecting city-
wide debates about resources, politics andmobility to conflicts over homes
and streets. In this case, black and white neighbours shared a common
desire to protect their communities, but this was an exception to the
rule in twentieth-century America. The dominant trend was segregation,
as explained by Trevon Logan and John Parman in ‘The national rise
in residential segregation’, J. of Economic History, 77 (2017), 127–70. This
comprehensive article shows how segregation doubled between 1880 and
1940, which was long before the urban crisis and decades of white flight.
In fact, the authors assert that increasing racial sorting at the household
level was much more important for segregation than large-scale urban
developments.
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In general, the planned urban resettlements of the twentieth century
were a solution to what planning historian Peter Hall has labelled ‘the
city of dreadful night’, which featured prominently in the periodical
literature of 2017. In ‘Surviving the industrial city: the female poor and
theworkhouse in late nineteenth-century Belfast’,Urban History, 44 (2017),
69–90, Olwen Purdue focuses on welfare provision in Belfast, in particular
the secularized workhouses. Here, poor mothers and their children could
make use ofwelfare services regardless of their faith, whichwere provided
by middle-class women. Thus, Purdue argues that workhouses can shed
a new light on the class identities and behaviour of women. In a
similar contribution, ‘Womanliness in the slums: a free kindergarten in
early twentieth-century Edinburgh’, Gender & History, 29 (2017), 359–86,
Elizabeth Darling shows how a free childcare facility was the product of
a network of women urban reformers, who greatly contributed to social
welfare and early childhood education. In a methodologically innovative
article, ‘A tale of two cities – infant mortality and cause of infant death,
Dublin, 1864–1910’, Urban History, 44 (2017), 647–77, Ciara Breathnach
and Brian Gurrin also uncover new social relations and realities in
the Victorian city. With the use of contemporary mortality rates and
extensive mapping, Breathnach and Gurrin conclude that Dublin’s urban
poor were much more affected by bad living conditions and diseases
than deprived people living in rural Ireland or other UK conurbations,
paying special attention to the city’s historical rootedness of social
inequality.
Those who did not survive the hardship and misery of living in a
nineteenth-century Victorian slum could not always rest in peace, as
Maximilian Scholz demonstrates in ‘Over our dead bodies: the fight over
cemetery construction in nineteenth-century London’, J. of Urban History,
43 (2017), 445–57. Whereas cemeteries have always been interpreted as
great achievements in the provision of public health, Scholz highlights the
struggles Londoners fought against the establishment of graveyards near
their homes. In fact, the construction of the ‘Magnificent Seven’ cemeteries
between 1832 and 1841 was driven by private entrepreneurship with
ambivalent consequences. While church revenues waned, public parks
were closed and social segregation was aggravated, a rapidly growing
Londonwas providedwith newburial spaces and thus better public health
conditions. Another nineteenth-century concern of urban public health
were stray dogs, omnipresent in all western metropolises but especially
in Paris. In the lengthy, well-researched ‘Stray dogs and the making
of modern Paris’, Past and Present, 234 (2017), 137–72, Chris Pearson
details the changing political and cultural attitudes towards strays. Local
authorities, in particular those of a city that was in the international
vanguard of urban sanitation, quickly associated the quadrupeds with
deathly diseases such as rabies and urban disorder in general. Despite
their efforts, health officials and police officers were never able to control
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the phenomenon fully, leaving Parisians at risk of being bitten by a rabid
stray.
As always, some themes in the periodical literature are recurring for
no particular reason. This year, there was a strong presence of articles
connecting communism with the urban. In ‘The Russian Revolution in
New York, 1917–1919’, J. of Contemporary History, 52 (2017), 959–79, Tony
Michels lays bare the attitudes towards Bolshevism as it constellated
among immigrant Jews in New York City, demonstrating the global
reverberations and repercussions of the Russian Revolution. As Natallia
Barykina exemplifies in ‘Transnational mobilities: western European
architects and planners in the Soviet industrial cities, 1928–1933’, Planning
Perspectives, 32 (2017), 333–52, 10 years later, the Soviet Union had become
an appealing travel destination for western architects and planners. The
nascent Soviet state, which by the late 1920s had just embarked on its first
Five-Year Plan, could not do without western expertise on designing and
building standardized housing projects, implying extensive knowledge
transfers and frequent working visits. After the Iron Curtain had come
down in the 1950s, such contacts became increasingly difficult. Some
planners working for communist regimes decided to flee, as was the case
with Egon Hartmann. Annika Levels, ‘Across the border. Ties of architects
and urban planners between East and West Germany: the case of Egon
Hartman, 1954–1976’, Planning Perspectives (2017), 557–76, asserts that the
integration of a personal dimension and specific communication patterns
into our understanding of Cold War history reveals rather informal ties
across the Iron Curtain. Also from a non-design perspective 2017 was
a fruitful year for those urban historians interested in socialism and
communism. In ‘Crosstown traffic: punk, rock, space and the porosity of
the BerlinWall in the 1980s’,Contemporary European History, 26 (2017), 353–
77, Jeff Hayton argues that the political legitimacy of the East German
government was undermined by a lively punk subculture, which was
heavily influenced and even frequented by alternative youths from West
Germany.
To what extent have cities, their physical form, cultural identities
and symbolic meanings, influenced the course of the aforementioned
urban histories? In other words, do cities have agency and if so, how
can we define it? Such were the questions of a special issue by Urban
History, Simon Gunn, ‘Urban agency: debating the aims and limits
of urban history’, Urban History, 44 (2017), 110. In a wide array of
contributions, scholars from various backgrounds give tentative answers
to these challenging questions. In ‘The technosphere: a new concept for
urban studies’, Urban History, 44 (2017), 145–54, Chris Otter urges us to
meld the meanings of agency and city together in the technosphere, an
envirotechnical formation influencing our way of life far more than we
have realized ourselves so far. In a similar way, Bert de Munck, ‘Re-
assembling actor-network theory and urban history’, Urban History, 44
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(2017), 111–22, presents Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as ‘the natural
ally of history’, enabling us to study the development of capitalism as
a material and cultural process simultaneously. Hopefully, next year’s
periodical reviewwill boast at least a few contributions in which this well-
known but empirically underused theory is put to the test.
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